B.A. Tel Aviv Univ.; D.Phil. Oxford (1990)

Full Professor (2003)

Ethics, the free will problem, justice, problems of self-deception and social illusions.

My main interests are the free will problem; normative ethics (with special emphasis on moral paradoxes, meta-normative theory, and the notion of contribution); and the role of illusion and self-deception in our lives. I am working on some new paradoxes, and thinking on what all this paradoxicality might mean. I have also begun to work on a bigger project, which concerns the idea of a "crazy ethics", whereby our true (or at least most plausible) moral beliefs might in some ways be "crazy". This project incorporates much of my previous work on free will, moral paradoxes, and illusion.

FREE WILL AND ILLUSION. Oxford University Press (Oxford) 2000 (Hardback);
2002 (Paperback).

A look inside

Opinions about the book

Citations (91)

10 MORAL PARADOXES. Blackwell Publishing (Malden, MA) 2007 (Hardback & Paperback).

A look inside

Opinions about the book

A sampler of quotations

Translations (actual and forthcoming): Hebrew, Korean, Polish, Portuguese

[Most of the new chapter on moral paradoxes in the 3rd edition of R.M Sainsbury's PARADOXES (Cambridge University Press, 2009) is devoted to a discussion of my work in 10 MORAL PARADOXES. Sainsbury discusses in detail three paradoxes: Fortunate Misfortune, The Paradox of Non-Punishment, and Not Being Sorry about the Morally Bad.]

An interview on my book on Bloggingheads.tv

1. "Van Inwagen on the 'Obviousness' of Libertarian Moral Responsibility", ANALYSIS vol.50 (1990), pp.29-33.

2. "Utilitarianism and the 'Punishment' of the Innocent: The General Problem", ANALYSIS vol.50 (1990), pp.256-261.

3. "The Point in Principled Divestiture", PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY vol.7 (1993), pp.257-260.
Reprinted in David Boonin and Graham Oddie, WHAT'S WRONG? APPLIED ETHICISTS AND THEIR CRITICS (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

4. "The Time to Punish", ANALYSIS vol.54 (1994), pp.50-53.

[A reply to this paper is Christopher New, "Punishing Times: Reply to Smilansky", ANALYSIS vol.55 (1995), pp.60-62.]

5. "On Practising What We Preach", AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY vol.31 (1994), pp.73-79.

6. "The Ethical Advantages of Hard Determinism", PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH vol.54 (1994), pp.355-363.

[A reply to this paper is Richard Double, "The Ethical Advantages of Free Will Subjectivism", PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH vol.69 (2004), pp.411-422.]

7. "Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?", JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY vol.12 (1995), pp.41-53.

8. "May We Stop Worrying About Blackmail?", ANALYSIS vol.55 (1995), pp.116-120.

9. "Responsibility and Desert: Defending the Connection", MIND vol.105 (1996), pp.157-163.

[A reply to this paper is Fred Feldman, "Responsibility as a Condition for Desert", MIND vol.105 (1996), pp.165-168.]

10. "The Connection Between Responsibility and Desert: The Crucial Distinction", MIND vol.105 (1996), pp.385-386.

11. "Egalitarian Justice and the Importance of the Free Will Problem", PHILOSOPHIA vol.25 (1997), pp.153-161.

[A reply to this paper is Sung-Hak Kang, "Free Will and Distributive Justice: A Reply to Smilansky", PHILOSOPHIA vol.31 (2003), pp.107-126.]

12. "Should I Be Grateful to You For Not Harming Me?", PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH vol.42 (1997), pp.585-597.

13. "Preferring Not to Have Been Born", AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY vol.75 (1997), pp.241-247.

14. "Free Will: From Nature to Illusion", PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY vol.101 (2001), pp.71-95.
Reprinted in Michael McKenna and Paul Russell, eds., FREE WILL AND REACTIVE
ATTITUDES: Perspectives on P.F. Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment"
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).

15. "Blackmail", ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ETHICS 2nd Edition, (London: Routledge, 2001).

16. "Free Will, Fundamental Dualism and the Centrality of Illusion", in Robert. Kane, ed., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.489-505.
Reprinted in John Martin Fischer, ed., FREE WILL (Critical Concepts in Philosophy series) (London: Routledge, 2005), vol.4.

17. "On Free Will and Ultimate Injustice", IYYUN vol.52 (2003), pp.41-55. [A reply to James Lenman.]

18. "Choice-Egalitarianism and the Paradox of the Baseline", ANALYSIS vol.63 (2003), pp.146-51.

[A reply to this paper is Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, "Smilansky's Baseline Objection to Choice-Egalitarianism", SATS - Nordic Journal of Philosophy vol.5 (2004), pp.147-50.]

[Another reply to this paper is Tal Manor, "Inequality: Mind the Gap! A reply to Smilansky's Paradox of the Baseline", ANALYSIS vol.65 (2005), pp.265-268.]

19. "Free Will and the Mystery of Modesty", AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY vol.40 (2003), pp.105-117.

20. "Free Will and Illusion: The Main Points", and "Free Will and Illusion: Replies To Criticism", IYYUN vol.52 (2003), pp.167-170; 187-191 (in Hebrew). [From a symposium on my book.]

21. "Can Deontologists Be Moderate?", UTILITAS vol.15 (2003), pp.71-75.

22. "Compatibilism: The Argument From Shallowness", PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES vol.115 (2003), pp.257-282.
Reprinted in Bruce Waller, ed., YOU DECIDE! - CURRENT DEBATES IN ETHICS (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2005).

23. "Free Will, Egalitarianism and Rawls", PHILOSOPHIA vol. 31 (2003), pp.127-138. [A reply to Sung-Hak Kang.]

24. "Terrorism, Justification, and Illusion", ETHICS vol.114 (2004), pp.790-805.
Reprinted in Thom Brooks, ed., THE GLOBAL JUSTICE READER (Oxford: Blackwell
Publications, 2008).

25. "Gratitude, Contribution and Ethical Theory", in Jonathan Seglow, ed., THE ETHICS OF ALTRUISM (London: Frank Cass, 2004).

26. "Reply to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen on the Paradox of the Baseline", SATS - Nordic Journal of Philosophy vol.5 (2004), pp.151-153.

27. "The Paradoxical Relationship Between Morality and Moral Worth", METAPHILOSOPHY vol.36 (2005), pp.490-500.

28. "Free Will and Respect For Persons", MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY vol.29 (2005), pp.248-261.

29. "On Not Being Sorry About the Morally Bad", PHILOSOPHY vol.80 (2005), pp.261-5.

30. "The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement", RATIO vol.18 (2005), pp.332-337.

[A reply to this paper is James Lenman, "Why I Have No Plans to Retire: In Defence of Moderate Professional Complacency", RATIO vol.20 (2007), pp.241-246.]

[Another reply to this paper is Ronald J. Manheimer, "The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement: A Journey into the Vortex of Nothingness", JOURNAL OF AGING, HUMANITIES, AND THE ARTS vol.2 (2008), pp.84-98.]

31. "Choice-Egalitarianism and the Paradox of the Baseline: A Reply to Manor", ANALYSIS vol.65 (2005), pp.333-337.

32. "The Paradox of Moral Complaint", UTILITAS vol.18 (2006), pp.284-290.

33. "Control, Desert, and the Difference Between Distributive and Retributive Justice", PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES vol.131 (2006), pp.511-524.

34. "The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement: A Reply to Lenman", RATIO vol.20 (2007), pp.348-351.

35. "Determinism and Prepunishment: The Radical Nature of Compatibilism", ANALYSIS vol.67 (2007), pp.347-349.

[A reply to this paper is Stephen Kearns, "Compatibilism Can Resist Prepunishment: A Reply to Smilansky", ANALYSIS vol.68 (2008), pp.250-253.]

[Another reply to this paper is Helen Beebee, "Smilansky's Alleged Refutation of Compatibilism", ANALYSIS vol.68 (2008), pp.258-260.]

[A third reply to this paper is Matt Talbert, "Compatibilism, Common Sense, and Prepunishment", PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY, vol.23 (2009), pp.325-35.]

[Another reply to this paper is Bill Wringe, "Pre-punishment, Communicative Theories of Punishment and Compatiblism", PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, forthcoming.]

36. "Prepunishment For Compatibilists: A Reply to Kearns", ANALYSIS vol.68 (2008), pp.254-257.

37. "More Prepunishment For Compatibilists: A Reply to Beebee", ANALYSIS vol.68 (2008), pp.260-263.

38. "Fischer's Way: The Next Level", in a symposium on John Martin Fischer's MY WAY, JOURNAL OF ETHICS vol.12 (2008), pp.147-155.

[Fischer responds in "MY WAY and Life's Highway: Replies to Steward, Smilansky and Perry" JOURNAL OF ETHICS vol.12 (2008), pp.167-189.]

39. "Free Will and Fairness", in Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen, eds., ESSAYS ON FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (Cambridge: Scholars Publishing, 2008).

40. "Free Will: Some Bad News", in Michael O'Rourke, ed., ACTION, ETHICS, AND RESPONSIBILITY: TOPICS IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, vol.7, forthcoming.

41. "When Does Morality Win?", RATIO, forthcoming.

42. "If Knowledge Is Good, We Are Always Born Too Early", JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY, forthcoming.

43. "Moral Demands, Moral Pragmatics, and Being Good", UTILITAS, forthcoming.

1. Free Will: Two Radical Proposals
2. Egalitarianism, Free Will, and Ultimate Injustice

Boycott Days

Determinism and Prepunishment: two discussions of my papers from the blog Garden of Forking Paths, here and here.

Determinism and Prepunishment: The Comics Version

An interesting study in experimental philosophy that attempts to refute my
free will Illusionism empirically

Why Do Ethicists Write Such Long Papers? A discussion in Ethics-etc is here, followed by a poll and further discussion here.

Some Questions About Moral Paradoxes (a five-part series of informal posts that appeared in the blog Ethics-etc.):
1. What is a moral paradox?
2. How can we tell moral paradoxes from non-paradoxes?
3. Where do moral paradoxes come from?
4. What should we do about moral paradoxes?
5. What can we learn from moral paradoxes?

Jean Kazez blogged on most of my paradoxical book in Talking Philosophy. Jean's discussion was perceptive; the comments were uneven, but some interesting points came up. I sometimes responded. The paradoxes discussed were chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 from the book; and then some general comments.

The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement: discussions in the philosophical blogs Leiter Reports and
In Socrates' Wake, and in the economics blog Marginal Revolution

The Paradox of Blackmail at the New Yorker

The Paradox of Non-Punishment in pursuit of the bankers

The Paradox of Non-Punishment: a discussion in the ethics blog PEA Soup